Review essay on three monographs on East Germany by Dale, G
Dissolution; The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany,     Charles 
Maier, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997 
The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989,                  Jeffrey 
Kopstein, University of North Carolina Press, 1997 
Varieties of Transition; The East European and East German Experience,  Claus 
Offe, Cambridge: Polity, 1996 
 
On 7th October 1989 East German leaders gathered at the 'Palace of the 
Republic' to celebrate the fortieth birthday of their state - one which Charles 
Maier describes as (xii) 'a repressive little state built on public self-
congratulations and pervasive policing.' Despite the pomp and pageantry, all 
was not well. Gorbachev was in town, and his name was chanted by 
demonstrators outside, as a symbol of hopes in political reform. The first open 
signs of division in the politburo had just appeared. The assembled guests 
were nervous. Some exchanged dark jokes. One went as follows: after the 
sinking of the Titanic, three countries began to work on its salvage, each with 
a keen motive. The USA was after the gold in the safes. The USSR was 
interested in the technology of the machinery. And the GDR? Its leaders were 
desperate to discover which pieces had been played - so bravely - by the 
orchestra as the ship went down. 
The three books reviewed here address some of the key questions concerning 
the sinking of the GDR. Why did its leaders refuse to change course? Why did 
much of the population mutiny? What was the historical significance of the 
uprising? 
Each author brings a distinctive angle to these issues, as reflected in the 
questions asked as well as the answers given. Jeffrey Kopstein focuses on the 
interaction of structural constraints with the strategies of the ruling elite; his 
main theme is the mediations between economic decline and political 
strategy. Beginning from the constraints on policy - in the shape above all of 
workers' resistance, Soviet domination, and East Germany's insertion into the 
world economy - he demonstrates how the SED leadership's strategic choices, 
though rational in the short term, proved ultimately irrational. In attempting 
to explain why the 'irrational' course was maintained, his analysis illuminates 
the structural preconditions of the 1989 revolution. His theme is not the 
revolution as such - not the process, nor the actors, nor the outcome. For 
Kopstein, the protestors are simply assumed to be driven by the desire for a 
Western lifestyle, as a result of their experience of 'relative deprivation'. 
German unification is implied to be the cardinal outcome of the revolution, 
and is assumed to be inscribed in the sheer fact of the East's material 
poverty. The pathway from revolutionary situation to actual outcome requires 
no distinct elucidation. 
Charles Maier, by contrast, has a sharp interest in crucibles of expanding 
historical choice, as exemplified in revolutionary situations. If Maier has won 
deserved esteem for his many profound and wide-ranging studies on the 
making of the modern world, this is surely due not only to his acute historical 
sensibility but also because his guiding standards are informed by the spirit 
and ideals of the American revolution, against which the modern world seems 
so terribly corrupt. 'As a citizen of the United States', his discussion of 1989 
begins (xx), he is 'proud that the values which my country has represented - 
at least in its best moments - proved so contagious.' For Maier, the 'Citizens 
Movements' of Eastern Europe are worthy inheritors of the values of liberty, 
equality and fraternity - those 'founding principles' of the USA, which 'will 
hopefully retain their attraction' in years to come. 
Though sharing Maier's commitment to the ideals of bourgeois society 
(particularly the 'rule of law'), Claus Offe's account of 1989 is decidedly 
different, being strongly marked by fatalism and pessimism. Although only 
hinted at in this volume, the background to this tone is Offe's pioneering 
development of the 'new social movement paradigm' in the 1980s.1 For Offe, 
these movements (42) 'focus on overcoming some of the built-in biases, 
deficiencies and blind spots' of the major political and economic institutions. 
New social movements, he argued, would arise on the ashes of 'old' labour 
movements; they promised to become beneficial buttresses to the pillars of 
bourgeois democracy. Since the mid-1980s, however, Offe's hopes have been 
dashed, and the 'NSM paradigm' referred to the museum of curious 
conceptions. With hindsight he writes that (197) 'At the beginning of the 
eighties ... on the occasion of the marriage of the new social movements, the 
general prediction [i.e. Offe's prediction] was for a trend towards a post-
industrial society in which the significance of "materialist" realms of politics 
geared towards guiding values such as growth and [social security] would 
recede', giving way to 'postmaterialist' movements based on issues such as 
peace and ecology which should 'lend a strong impetus to a "post-industrial 
Left".' Thus, Offe wrote the volume considered here after becoming aware that 
his 'speculative position [had] proved to be completely erroneous.' The 
impression given by this volume is that his disappointment in the stillbirth of 
the Western 'postindustrial Left' applies equally to the 'postmaterialist' 
Citizens Movement organizations of 1989, as they floundered in the face of 
political crisis, before being rapidly marginalized by the 'materialist' movement 
for German unification. 
 
The constraints of SED rule 
 
I begin with Kopstein's geometry of 'confining conditions'. He concentrates on 
three spheres which constrained the strategic choices available to the SED: 
industrial relations, military rivalries and alliances, and economic 
competition. 
On industrial relations, Kopstein's book fills something of a gap, at least in 
the English literature. In his account, East German rulers, following WWII, 
faced a working class which had gained a considerable degree of control over 
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much of industry and, to a surprising extent, resisted the competitive culture 
demanded by the imperatives of accumulation. Especially where 'enterprise 
councils' were strong, the prevailing shop floor ethic was (21) 'egalitarian, 
cooperative, defensive, and geared toward survival rather than the 
maximization of gain.' As economic growth resumed, the labour market 
tightened, and was exacerbated by booming demand from West Berlin. 'Such 
market conditions', with workers 'chang[ing] jobs relatively freely', notes 
Kopstein, 'gave the working class a power of sorts' (156-7) - and presented 
managers and officials with major headaches. Their response, in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, centred on intensive efforts to undermine solidarity 
and improve productivity by raising differentials and introducing 'a rigorous 
Taylorist labor regime' (18). Labour market competition was complemented by 
the granting of differential rewards related to performance (piece work etc.) 
and political loyalty. Schemes of 'socialist competition' were introduced in 
which workers (and work brigades) were pitted against one another (and were 
obliged in the process to commit themselves ritually to 'the party and its 
production goals.' (164)) 
The employers' offensive faced widespread and tenacious resistance, which 
Kopstein illustrates with many examples. For example (27), '[w]here 
management stiffened its resolve to increase wage and consumer good 
differentials, workers often spontaneously evened out the differences by 
purchasing goods for each other.' According to SED reports (29), 'many 
foremen could not be stopped from putting all the piecework tickets in a 
common urn in order to ensure equality of reward.' 'Workers and enterprise 
councils spontaneously eliminated piecework and often removed time clocks 
at plant entrances as symbols of work speedups and other distasteful aspects 
of capitalist (and Nazi) [sic] industrial life.' (27). Those who did go along with 
managerial ideals of 'activism' and norm-busting 'tended to be despised and 
isolated by the rank-and-file employees' (33). 
It is at this point in the story that the second of Kopstein's 'confining 
conditions' - geopolitics - intervenes. In his opinion (35), '[t]he cat-and-mouse 
game' of industrial struggle might have continued as a war of attrition 'had 
the cold war not taken a new turn.' In its earliest phase East Germany had 
existed as a paradox and a problem for the USSR. Raising its flag over the 
Reichstag in Berlin marked the historical high-watermark of the Kremlin's 
power; yet the territory occupied, being a small fraction of pre-war Germany, 
was not envisaged as a viable entity. It was intended by Stalin simply as a 
bargaining chip to be exchanged for the neutralization of Germany. The Soviet 
zone was substantially weaker than its western twin: its economy was 
especially dislocated by the division of Germany, and, rather than receiving 
Marshall Aid it was subjected to years of intensive plunder by Moscow. Far 
from being the triumphant outcome of a German revolution, it was nothing 
but naked geopolitical (and geo-ideological) rivalry - the developing 
antagonism between the USA and Russia - which, in Maier's phrase (23) 
'locked the Russians into reinforcing East Germany's national status.' Part of 
this process involved cementing it into a keystone of Soviet empire. In 
emulation of the economic model of the conquering power, a substantial 
heavy industrial base was reconstructed beneath a sturdy military machine. 
In 1952, in Kopstein's words (35), '[u]nder Soviet orders the East Germans 
committed themselves to building up their armed forces and defense industry 
at a cost of 1.5 billion marks, to be financed from reductions in social 
spending coupled with higher taxation.' The upshot of this austerity was a 
rapid deterioration of living standards for much of the population. Together 
with deepening divisions in the Soviet leadership, which catalysed U-turns 
and vacillation amongst their counterparts in the GDR and generated 
confusion throughout the ruling institutions, a revolutionary situation 
developed, culminating in a mass strike and uprising in June 1953. 
The uprising, though eventually crushed by Soviet troops, starkly reminded 
the SED of its limited room for manoeuvre on the industrial front. As Kopstein 
remarks (37) it 'effectively crippled the regime on the shop floor', and forced it 
to proceed more cautiously. In the following decades (18), 'fearing a repetition 
of the June events, labor peace could be bought only at the price of long-term 
stagnation in labour relations, wage structures, and productivity incentives.' 
Except for the construction of the Berlin Wall, which 'tourniqueted the flow of 
skilled labor and stabilized the political situation' (Maier 87), the SED scored 
few major successes in its battle to weaken what Kopstein describes as 
workers' substantial 'tacit power'.2 
 
Organizing stability 
 
By crushing the 1953 uprising and backing the building of the Wall Moscow 
demonstrated a 'fraternal solidarity' with its German creature that was set to 
grow in strength.3 These acts of brute intimidation doubtless helped to 
promote attitudes of deference (or 'legitimacy'). They represented a determined 
assertion of class power which, by securing domestic and international 
stability, promoted a growing recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state. 
However, the grammar of rule is invariably more elaborate than simply the 
guttural sounds of concrete and lead. Maier's distinctive take on this is what 
he calls the 'corruption of the public sphere'. His use of this term is broad, 
and not unlike Gramsci's (80): 'Between consent and force stands corruption 
[which aims to] sow disarray and confusion', for example by 'procuring the 
demoralisation and paralysis of the antagonist'. Maier applies the concept 
liberally - for instance to familiar phenomena in 'advanced' societies such as 
(41) 'the growing role of private wealth for political participation, the 
replacement of debate with simplified slogans and images of personality' as 
well as other symptoms of media power such as the increasing prominence 
within political discourse of 'the interaction of television audiences and 
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 'Paradoxically,' Maier suggests (23), 'uncertainties within the Soviet 
bloc strengthened the Soviet commitment to the East German state. Any notion 
of trading it for neutralization of a united Germany became far too 
adventurous for even the reformist Khrushchev, once the Polish and Hungarian 
upheavals shook Eastern Europe in 1956'. 
interpretors of public opinion.' 
In the East German case, corruption of the public sphere entailed the state 
exploiting its command over resources so as to insert its interests into the 
nooks and crannies of everyday life. Far from establishing legitimacy through 
ideological conviction it sought to govern through private bargains with 
citizens. Citizens were treated as clients in a relationship that promoted 
amongst the latter attitudes of needy subordination. Above all, the 
distribution of resources was used as an instrument of division. Although 
nominally based upon solidarity (39), 'the regime survived precisely by 
undermining solidarity with differential rewards such as travel and education, 
even by dividing up its supposedly loyal proletarian supporters into 
competitive work brigades, and by rewarding snooping.' In Maier's depiction, 
the public sphere was pork barrel politics writ large: those who bowed and 
scraped gained privileges, with the regime hoping to reap loyalty in return. 
Even the Stasi's activities, Maier argues, are best understood as corruption 
rather than repression. The Stasi (47) 'wove large numbers of East Germans, 
over 1 percent of the whole population, probably over 10 percent of the adult 
"intellectual" population, into a network of corrupting complicity, [making] 
complicity a key principle of governance.' Its officials saw themselves (48) 'as 
much as social workers as policemen', often sincerely believing that the 
'objects of investigation should be grateful for the tutelage provided.' Its true 
function consisted less in the specific information gleaned and the uses to 
which it was put than in the general opaqueness created for the regime - a 
power of mystification and secrecy upon which the ability to corrupt 
independent action and stifle dissent depended. 
 
Economic reform 
 
The third basis of SED rule - apart from force and corruption - was economic 
growth. Given the intensity of geopolitical and geoeconomic competition 
(above all versus the FRG), and given the wage pressure from what Kopstein 
describes (157) as 'a highly skilled and mature labor force', competitive 
productivity growth was the key priority of the nomenclatura. Even a casual 
glance at SED documents, Kopstein suggests (1), 'reveals how obsessed the 
leadership of the SED was with improving economic performance and how 
focused it was on comparisons with production and consumption levels in the 
West.' 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Maier notes (81-8), growth was rapid, especially in 
the spheres of investment and rearmament. More significantly, 'growth rates 
from the 1950s through the 1960s and into the 1970s were comparable with 
those in the West'. Such indicators of success, however, concealed a widening 
productivity gap with the FRG which, Kopstein registers (4), was uniquely 
painful and politically sensitive. Worried by this productivity slippage, 
sections of the ruling class developed plans for major economic reform. 
Against the background of detente - in which a relaxation of orthodoxy 
became more thinkable - and drawing on Soviet reform ideas and recent 
Western texts on management (Kopstein 49), plans were drawn up to 
introduce market mechanisms and to grant greater autonomy to firms. SED 
leader Ulbricht even came close to endorsing the mechanism of bankruptcy. 
Over seven years some of these plans were put into practice, in what was 
known as the New Economic System (NÖS). 
The results of NÖS were hardly promising. They ran up against problems of 
three sorts. The first, Kopstein argues (11), was opposition by workers and 
managers. Following years of resistance to Taylorization and in the wake of 
the 1953 uprising the SED had been forced to give workers 'a virtual veto 
power over wages, prices, and work norms', thereby conceding to them a 
degree of ability 'to restrict the range of plausible reforms at a later period.' 
One plank of NÖS, due to begin in trial form in 1966, involved a shift to 
profitability as the determinant of investment decisions; as such it would 
necessarily entail closures and lay-offs. Kopstein relates how in one trial 
scheme (62) '[t]hose threatened with transfers to new work put up stiff 
resistance. Coal miners and their managers in Zwickau brought the situation 
to the edge of revolt. In the face of these prospects, plans to close down 
certain parts of the coal mine were quickly dropped.' The trial scheme was 
effectively scuppered. 
The second problem was that reform decreased the ability of the central 
planning authorities to ration demand, giving rise 'to bottlenecks and 
stagnation of consumer goods ... energy crises ... and an unavowed inflation.' 
(Maier 92). More significantly, economic devolution, through attenuating the 
state's control over the economy - for example by allowing enterprise 
managers to engage directly in foreign trade - raised the spectre of centrifugal 
forces undermining the power of the central authorities and, by extension, of 
the power of the Kremlin's hegemony over Eastern Europe. The fate of the 
reformist government in Czechoslovakia highlighted the latter question. It is 
this constraint which led to intervention against Ulbricht by Brezhnev, and 
which leads Maier (89) to explain the termination of NÖS in 1970 as reform 
falling 'victim to the logic of imperial control.' 
 
Economic decline 
 
For Maier the termination of NÖS was a pivotal mistake. Despite the (hardly 
promising) example of reformist Hungary, he suggests that market reforms 
could have rescued East German profitability. Whereas (79) most 'Western 
economic analysts' - including Kopstein - 'have maintained that the final 
crisis of communism merely culminated its insoluble long-term 
contradictions', Maier sticks his neck out and 'proposes an alternative 
scenario, namely that socialist policy makers might have evolved toward more 
flexible production in the 1960s, but then put off reforms for a fateful decade 
or more.'  
Whatever the merits of such speculation, it is certainly true that the early 
1970s mark a watershed in East Germany as well as elsewhere in the Soviet 
bloc and beyond. For one thing, these were the years when '[c]apitalism and 
communism together left behind the period of rapid and relatively easy capital 
accumulation that marked the quarter century after World War II to enter a 
far more troubled era' (Maier 81). But more significantly, although 'many of 
the difficulties of communism also assailed the West' - where 'painful' 
restructuring was attempted - in the East, relative decline evolved into drawn-
out and worsening crisis. 
Why was this? Maier's explanation centres on the relation between the 
peculiar structures of the Soviet economies and the world economy. The 
USSR had become locked into a particular complex of structures - economic, 
political, geopolitical - that had in mid-century been innovative and singularly 
conducive to capital accumulation, enabling it to achieve regional hegemony, 
recover from war, rearm, and rebuild an industrial base, but these (now 
replicated throughout Eastern Europe) were becoming fetters on further 
growth. 'Mobilized' societies aiming to overtake western rivals became 'siege' 
societies stuck in a vicious circle of decline. In the East German case, being 
relatively small and advanced, the contradictions were felt especially 
painfully.4 
Maier develops his thesis in two different ways. The first is rather conjectural. 
It suggests that command economies have a natural affinity to the stage of 
development which characterized the industrialized world from 1930 to 1970, 
'because the preponderant technology of the era seemed to be based on large 
productive units and heavy industry' (97) where efficiency was conceived in 
terms of the 'mechanized output of standardized products.' Communism 
subscribed to 'the romance of coal and steel', a type of product which is, 
Maier presumes, peculiarly amenable to central planning. 
In advancing this case Maier points to real phenomena - the ecologically 
disastrous commitment of the SED to expanding lignite production, the 
extreme emphasis on heavy industry, and the 'soft budget constraints' which 
enabled once-competitive sectors to be maintained when world conditions had 
long rendered them obsolete. But do such 'inefficiencies' emanate from an 
affinity of central planning with an outdated (simple and heavy) stage of 
technological development? And has the world economy really shifted to a 
new 'flexible' phase based upon smaller units and greater complexity? By 
some criteria the opposite would seem to be the case. The size of firms in most 
sectors is nowadays larger than in mid-century, and make East German 
'giants' seem like dwarves.5 Meanwhile the developing division of labour 
continues to underwrite tendencies to greater standardization of mass 
production, and to simplification of processes at the micro level. 
Maier's second angle relates to the international division of labour. He 
highlights how the Comecon economies were structurally organized to resist 
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 In the vehicle industry, for example, the largest East German players 
employed under one tenth as many workers as General Motors; the gap was 
larger still if measured by turnover. 
'the encroaching world market' (104). In order, however, to benefit from the 
possibilities of international trade and production, and forced by the 
imperative of matching the scale, resources and reach of the world's leading 
firms, intensive engagement in the world economy was all but inevitable. The 
longer resistance lasted, the greater would be the pain of restructuring when 
integration came. In Maier's version of this thesis the world market operates 
essentially as a selection mechanism. His case would be stronger, however, if 
he posited the difficulties of integration into the burgeoning international 
division of labour as itself the chief cause of the relative decline which 
underlay the process of 'deselection'.6 
 
'Westwards pull' 
 
Although the cessation of NÖS and the replacement of Ulbricht by Honecker 
in 1971 were both linked to what Honecker himself described as the need to 
beware the '"pull to the West"' (Kopstein 71), and were followed by a 
recentralization of decision-making, these shifts by no means resulted in an 
end to closer integration into the world economy. Trade with the 'non-socialist 
abroad' continued to grow. Import-export firms were set up in the West to sell 
East German commodities, to speculate on stock markets, and to channel 
proceeds back to the hard-currency-starved domestic economy. 
Western imports comprised consumer goods, but also capital goods required 
to upgrade production. Import-led growth was a strategy that Ulbricht had 
already championed during the economic crisis of 1970, in the following terms 
(Kopstein 68): '[I]t is straightforward: We get as much debt with the 
capitalists, up to the limits of the possible, so that we can pull through in 
some way. A part of the products from the new plants must then be exported 
back to where we bought the machines and took on debt.' Under the sign of 
detente and Ostpolitik the expansion of trade and debt was striking. Net 
indebtedness to OECD countries, according to Kopstein (84), increased during 
the latter half of the 1970s by more than 20% annually! 
If the low cost of borrowing in the 1970s encouraged the strategy of import-led 
growth (and thus the deferral of restructuring and austerity), its rise as the 
decade ended provoked a major crisis - in East Germany as in Mexico, 
Poland, Peru and elsewhere. Investment geared to western markets was 
devalued when those markets slumped; accumulated levels of debt proved 
unsustainable when interest rates soared. As Nigel Harris has put it (192): 
'the whip to speed growth could as easily turn into a noose to strangle.' 
Under the pressure of crisis and the pull of the world market, Comecon began 
to fracture. By 1981, notes Kopstein (92), 'the Soviets were no longer in a 
position to do what they had always done when necessary - bail out the SED.' 
From effectively subsidizing its allies with cheap oil, the Soviet oil price began 
to approach world market levels and its supply became less assured. The 
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grave - or perhaps tragicomic - political effect of this was exemplified when 
Moscow diverted oil from East Germany to Poland in 1981. Honecker, 
painfully aware that over a billion DM had been invested in equipment to 
refine Soviet oil on the assumption that it would remain cheap and on tap, 
complained to Brezhnev (Kopstein 92) that the reduction 'undermines the 
foundation of the GDR's existence.' 
East Germany, like the rest of Eastern Europe, was in a double-bind. It was 
torn between closer integration into the world market (spelling debt and 
politically dangerous dependency), and retrenched orientation towards the 
Comecon bloc (which promised stagnation). Greater integration with the world 
economy exacerbated the GDR's vulnerability to fluctuations of world 
demand, interest rates, and to the dictates of 'hard' world standards and 
prices which exposed its seriously lagging productivity. Integration could 
therefore, paradoxically, tend to worsen the trade prospects of weaker, 
sheltered economies such as the East German, pushing them back towards 
'soft markets' and autarky. 
These smouldering economic contradictions and crises of the 1970s and 
1980s highlight Kopstein's reasons (12) for positing the 'international political 
economy' as the third imperative, or 'confining condition' (after workers' 
resistance and geopolitics) which delimited the strategic choices of the SED 
leadership. Inevitably, these broader imperatives which competed for political 
priority contradicted one another. For example, even as the 'social contract' of 
the 1970s was being prepared, in order to maintain peace on the labour front, 
the state planning commission produced a report which insisted that such 
measures could not be afforded. 'The effect, the paper argued, would be 
increasing indebtedness to the West and a ballooning domestic monetary 
overhang, as well as declining rates of capital accumulation.' (Kopstein 82). Of 
course, such clashes over priorities are the everyday currency of politics. But 
as underlying contradictions accumulate, political conflicts tend to become 
sharper. Maier highlights a dramatic case in 1988: when the Chief Planner 
proposed austerity measures (with his eye on ballooning debt) he was sharply 
attacked by Mittag, the Head of the Economy, (whose eye was on social 
stability). Maier reports that in the aftermath of the clash, the Stasi's 
economic unit 'warned how demoralizing an effect Mittag's attack was exerting 
on economic debate within party ranks' (Maier 72). 
In microcosm this dispute symbolizes a sea-change within the nomenclatura. 
Whereas in the 1960s leaders exuded confidence, and Ulbricht could even 
assert (Kopstein 67) that the GDR could 'succeed politically' by overtaking its 
Western rivals 'on the economic front'; by the 1980s a growing awareness that 
the confining conditions were closing in led to general demoralization. The 
nomenclatura, notes Maier (57), began to 'lose faith'; they began to 'share their 
critics' sense that the economic and social stalemate could not continue, but 
they did not know how to extricate themselves or devise decisive reforms.' 
With this cascade of contradictions in mind, and the resultant diminished 
room for manoeuvre experienced and perceived by policymakers, one can get 
to grips with the question as to why the iceberg was not avoided, why 
contradictions were not quietly resolved, why the SED leadership was driven 
to make what with hindsight appear to be 'mistakes', and why 'the political 
elite return[ed] time and again to the same solutions that did not work' 
(Kopstein xii). In contrast to Maier, who sees the (94) 'renewed wager on 
orthodoxy' of the 1970s as a serious mistake, Kopstein provides a shrewd 
explanation of why ruling classes are driven to make such 'mistakes'. His 
emphasis is on the constraints upon policy, and how choices (105) 'may be 
rational in the short run but irrational over the long run.' In the case of the 
GDR the constraints on reform included - apart from the lack of regularized 
regime change and the sheer inertia and complacency that may imbue any 
successfully established regime - the 'pull to the West', dependence upon the 
USSR, as well as the close interlocking of economic, political and cultural 
institutions, and the adhesion between economic structure and geopolitical 
alliance which meant, given its precarious economic and national status, that 
even piecemeal reform might catalyse the dissolution of the GDR. By the late 
1980s, then, (Kopstein 104) 'even if Honecker and company had wanted to 
"reform" the economy ... they would not have had an easy time of it. They 
were hemmed in by the choices both they and their predecessors had made at 
critical junctures in their state's history.' To recap, these included the 
Kremlin's decision to build East Germany as a front-line state, which required 
a massive rearmament programme which, in turn, catalysed the 1953 
uprising. This, together with East Germany's front-line situation, heightened 
the imperative of pacifying the working class, which, in turn, entailed 
measures that were to lower the chance that NÖS would succeed. This failure 
further limited Honecker's room for manoeuvre in the 1970s. 
This was the (domestic) context in which the revolution of 1989 occurred. 
From Maier's perspective (38), it was characterized by a ruling elite feeling 
'overwhelmed by social complexity'. In fact it was not complexity that 
overwhelmed, but rather their weakness and lack of cohesion in the face of 
ever more aggravated contradictions. As the revolutionary crisis deepened, 
demoralization palpably increased. With details emerging of unprecedented 
levels of debt (Maier 59), and with Gorbachev making contradictory 
pronouncements on the fate of East Germany (Maier 156), the SED's 
confidence crumbled. The only plausible reaction to such paralysing 
circumstances was, it seemed, to sit tight. In Kopstein's words (104) '[t]he 
SED elite believed that it faced an extreme version of the Tocquevillian 
paradox: unpopular governments become unstable when they start to reform 
themselves.' Though none may actually have read Tocqueville, 'their 
conversations in the final years reveal an intuitive understanding of their 
predicament. Reform seemed to be both necessary and unimaginable.' 
 
Accidental breakdown? 
 
What sense should be made of this breakdown of the SED ancien regime? On 
this subject Offe makes a headstrong claim. He argues (24) that the 
'breakdown of the GDR cannot be explained in terms of ... a coming to a head 
of long-inherent crisis tendencies, but must be accounted for in terms of a 
contingent and rather "accidental" chain of events'. '[W]hat was involved was 
not a process of crisis and conflict that had long been on the cards and in the 
final instance was intrinsically ineluctable, but rather a configuration of 
economic, political and international affairs related to specific persons that 
appears improbable retrospectively, and at best to have had a certain 
inevitability about it.' (135). Elaborating this theme elsewhere (Elster et al., 2), 
he writes that 'the events of 1989-91 were essentially triggered by contingent 
and erratic personal decisions at the top level of the Soviet elite that followed 
no known rule or pattern whatsoever and in the absence of which the system 
might well have survived for some undeterminable span of life.' 
While Offe is certainly correct to deny any automatic progression from 
economic crisis to revolution, his case for contingency is untenable, and rests 
on two misconceptions. The first, empirical, is the claim that the East German 
economy displayed 'an immunity to crises' (141). In fact, as Naumann and 
Trümpler demonstrate (5), serious crises occurred in 1948/9, 1953, 1956, 
1961, 1970/1, and 1979/80, not to mention 1989.7 The second problem is 
methodological. Offe's absolute separation of determination and contingency 
makes little sense when applied to actual historical processes. That Hungary 
opened the iron curtain may be 'contingent', but that it did so was surely 
linked to the 'pull to the West' outlined above. It seems to me that a more 
helpful conception of the role of contingency is indicated in Trotsky's 
intriguing formulation: '[t]he entire historical process is a refraction of 
historical law through the accidental. In the language of biology, we might say 
that the historical law is realized through the natural selection of accidents.' 
(in Carr 102). Although each particular revolution may seem to be the 
outcome of a chain of accidents, the prevalence of revolutions and other sharp 
ruptures of political form is surely connected to the general processes 
whereby changes in productive forces and relations of exploitation take the 
form of, and are conditioned by, changing complexes of economic and political 
organization. These structures comprise an uneven and combined, and 
intrinsically competitive, global capitalism. When economic contradictions, 
and/or conflicting imperatives upon states, develop into economic, social 
and/or geopolitical crisis, and are interpreted as and acted upon as such, 
established structures become 'audited', subject to intense scrutiny.8 At such 
times leaders and supporters of failing institutions are liable to come under 
fire from challengers; the strategic scope for the latter, what Maier calls the 
'aperture of historical spontaneity', swiftly widens. 
It is, then, especially when old orders become subject to internal scrutiny and 
serious fracture that the potential for collective action 'from below' broadens. 
For the imperatives that determine policy - and/or the 'confining conditions' 
that occupy centre-stage in structuralist analysis of the Kopstein kind - are 
not externally articulated but internally related. Capitalism is best understood 
as a system with a symbiotic pair of core relations: as simultaneously 
                     
    
7
 Related to Offe's empirical misconception is the outlandish belief, 
which he shares with currents of thinking amongst Greens and the SED (though 
demonstrably not East German workers), that (18) '[t]he supply of consumer 
goods has been adequate and even relatively good since the 1960s'. 
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 'Audit' is adapted it from Corelli Barnett via Colin Hay. 
competitive and exploitative accumulation.9 The heart of the accumulation 
process is the continuous extraction of surplus labour, a process fuelled by 
the competitive relations existing among the various units of accumulation 
and constantly resisted by those subjected to it. Units of accumulation are 
classically conceived of as individual firms, but these can only operate if 
plugged into the other structures that shape the terrain upon which 
accumulation occurs: national currencies, nation states, geopolitical alliances, 
empires, etc. When the 'elites' that profit from and organize the process of 
accumulation and/or the political structures that regulate it are faced by 
crisis, the interests of the exploited are directly affected; and conditions 
become more conducive for mass collective action. It is to this that we now 
turn. 
 
Was it a revolution? 
 
In what sense was 1989 a revolution? The three authors give very different 
answers. Kopstein's is Skocpolesque. His lens is sharply focused upon 
structural contradictions, but lacks the flexibility to bring agency into view 
when its role moved to centre stage as the revolutionary crisis broke. The 
outcome of revolution is assumed to be inscribed in the determinants of the 
revolutionary crisis. Accordingly, Kopstein proclaims his framework as an 
alternative to one that highlights the 'mobilization of civil society'. 
Mobilization, he implies, is nothing but the steam that rises from the heat of 
structural clashes; it is merely 'one stage in the revolutionary process, and 
one that appears relatively late in the game.' (13). 
If Kopstein is dismissive of mobilization per se, Offe directs his fire specifically 
at arguments that champion the mobilizations of 1989. His case is that '1989 
was not a "revolution" ... but just the crumbling of an old regime', and for two 
main reasons. First, revolution is defined exceedingly strictly. To qualify, a 
political transition must evince the novelty of a virgin birth combined with 
militaristic precision in planning and execution. A proper revolution, he 
asserts (187) entails 'the construction of a new order built upon new ideas'. It 
can only occur (30-1) after the elaboration of a set of theoretical assumptions 
and normative arguments which address the questions of who should do 
what, at which time, and in what manner. 'In all of the revolutions of the last 
two centuries some kind of answer to these questions had been available 
before revolutionary action was undertaken.' In true revolutions the 
participants form (134) a 'revolutionary elite' whose actions are informed by a 
theory of revolutionary progress, and gain power by 'non-institutional means'. 
The historian can discern a 'premeditated sequence' of events, as well as 
'proven principles, interests, and organizational forms about which the 
participants were clear.' In East Germany, by contrast, there was 'no counter-
elite, no theory, no organization, no movement ... according to whose visions, 
instructions, and prescriptions the breakdown evolved.' (in Elster et al., 11). 
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 For a fuller exposition of these thoughts, see Barker and Dale. 
Instead, all that Offe perceives are 'individuals and their discoveries of the 
moment.' For Offe, revolutions are executed in the manner of recipes. 
Unfortunately, such a definition is incapable of apprehending the messiness 
and fluidity of actual revolutionary situations. Even where highly organized 
movements are prominent, the complex cross-cutting of different social 
interests, backing competing suggestions as to the means and ends according 
to which the crisis should be resolved, generates clashes both between and 
within social movements, and dramatic twists and turns in the course of 
events. Where such ruptures lead to situations of dual power and the 
stimulation of major innovations in the institutional basis and legitimizing 
principles of power on the part of contenders, as in 1789-94 France and 1917 
Russia, Offe's criterion of 'new ideas' is likely to be met. But if these advances 
provide the platform for organized revolutionaries to mobilize mass popular 
support towards clearly proclaimed ends, this stage is invariably reached as a 
consequence of the radicalization of an already present 'spontaneous' 
revolutionary situation. Theoretical innovation is stimulated by (and furthers) 
the radicalization of revolutions, but there is no reason to see it, with Offe, as 
a defining feature of revolution. Moreover, even the 'great' revolutions of 1789-
94 and 1917 are not autogenic, but develop through the appropriation and 
application of ideas from elsewhere. Conversely, revolutions that are more 
squarely imitative, such as Mao's struggle to inaugurate Stalinism in China, 
contain innovative moments. The movements of 1989, which generated 
peculiar (if recognizable) ideas blended from liberal, romantic, utopian 
socialist, and Christian sources, belong in the latter category. 
A second, related, problem with Offe's theorization of 1989 as a non-
revolution is that, in interpreting the 'crumbling' of the regime, he accords 
sole explanatory force to institutional change and none to social movements. 
In the case of the Soviet reform process his reference points are purely 
institutional, and never those agents of collective resistance - from 
Solidarnosc to the Mudjahedin - which expedited the Kremlin's turn to 
reform. In his account of East Germany (12), the implosion of SED authority 
occurred essentially because the ruling elite had lost confidence in the 
economy, followed by the raising of the iron curtain, Gorbachev's indications 
that Soviet military support could not be counted upon, and the consequent 
immobilization of the repressive apparatus. 'The demise of the regime was 
thus caused', he insists (20), 'by the loss of repressive pressure, not the rise of 
counter-pressure.' Evidence for this is that mobilization occurred only after 
'the collapse of the regime's ability to use repression was already well 
underway, and thus the citizens' movement could unfold in a relatively risk-
free way'. 'It was not the movement that brought about victory', Offe 
concludes (21), 'It was just the opposite: the obvious weakness of the state 
apparatus encouraged and triggered the growth of a democratic movement.' 
This sort of one-eyed, deterministic thinking is discussed perceptively by 
Maier, who is worth quoting at length. He inveighs against his (xiv) 'West 
German colleagues [who] have talked of an "implosion" of East Germany as if 
some worn-out machine finally just broke down.' They 'argued that no 
revolution had occurred. Instead, they claimed that the GDR had collapsed as 
a result of its inner difficulties; it had suffered "systems failure" or "imploded." 
These judgments were occasionally condescending. To a degree, the East 
German popular movement seemed actually embarrassing to some West 
German social scientists [who] were used to thinking in terms of abstract 
processes, and the powerful intrusion of crowds and demonstrations seemed 
vaguely threatening ... The East German protestors were like obstreperous 
children at an adults' dinner party.' (119). 
From Maier's more dialectical perspective, the weakening of the state and the 
burgeoning of social movements were mutually enhancing processes. Far 
from being a walk-on part, (xiv) 'at each critical juncture, the East Germans' 
collective action - no matter how hesitant at first, and how filled with doubts 
later - impelled decisive accommodations or allowed new initiatives.' He 
describes several of these critical junctures. First were the demonstrations by 
would-be emigrants. These culminated in early October when trainloads of 
westward-bound emigrants passed through Dresden, and 15,000 people 
besieged the station in an attempt to get on board. The police managed to 
thwart them in this aim, but failed to stop them regrouping to form a 
permanent demonstration (of fluctuating size) which wound through the city, 
periodically scuffling with police, for a marathon eighty hours. A few days 
later in 'Plauen, also on the route of the emigration-trains, 10,000 
demonstrators took to the streets and barricaded the mayor in his city hall' 
(145). The thrill of these days consisted in the dramatic and unexpected 
demonstration of the potential of collective mobilization to resist suppression. 
The state's omnipotent image was decisively punctured. 
Second came the demonstrations for political change, initially culminating in 
Leipzig on October 9th. On that day bloodshed seemed inevitable, with 
thousands of army and police deployed, many of them armed. But the sheer 
scale of the demonstration, which overawed and demoralized the local SED 
leadership and security forces, undermined any inclination to open fire. Of all 
the critical junctures this was a breathtakingly close call. No blood was shed, 
but had it been the course of the revolution could have been entirely different. 
Even if the fall of the Wall was the most memorable event of the revolution, 
the Leipzig demonstration was the closest parallel to the storming of the 
Bastille. It was only now that the old regime truly began to 'collapse', i.e. only 
after a showdown with an already highly mobilized movement. It is 
considerations such as this that lead Maier to judge that (120) 'at a critical 
instant, the crowds of Leipzig and Berlin pushed the process of Communist 
concession and erosion beyond the point of return.' Despite Offe, the 
movement did make a difference. It struck fear into the SED leadership, 
reconfigured the political agenda, and accelerated the pace of the crisis and 
collapse of the Soviet order, and later the pace of German unification. 
Moreover, Maier insists that the crowds 'were revolutionary': at least in the 
first month of protest they 'were bonded by a vision of an alternative public 
sphere; they shared a fraternal identity ...; they demonstrated the exaltation 
of will that social theorists such as Durkheim and Victor Turner have 
emphasized; they helped bring down a regime' (166). 
 
Dynamics of Revolution 
 A common narrative of 1989 is that the protest movement was united for the 
first month or so, after which it began to divide - between the original 
organizers of protest (the 'Citizens Movement') and a nationalistic movement 
for unification. The former is seen as radically democratic - in Zizek's words, 
'authentic' - the latter as inauthentic, conservative, and motivated chiefly by 
the 'seduction' of Western commodities. As to the regime, its backbone was 
cracked by the protests, after which it gave in to popular demands - replacing 
the head of state, opening the Wall, and paving the way for elections and 
unification. In short, both regime and state 'collapsed'. 
This interpretation is, as I shall indicate, as simplistic and misleading as it is 
ubiquitous. The Citizens Movement (CM) was in fact only one of the early 
organizers of protest in 1989, the other being the emigration movement. Its 
leaders' attitude to protest was ambiguous; many, such as Rainer Eppelmann 
(Maier 175) 'viewed the mass demonstrations in Leipzig with some uneasiness 
and called for their end once representatives of the regime were willing to 
talk.' They were reluctant to call the SED's monopoly of power into question; 
their goal was not to force the regime from power but to pressure and 
persuade it to reform, within the framework of an SED-CM 'dialogue'. But as 
Maier points out, this was a strategy that sought as much to brake as to 
mobilize protest: (176) '"dialogue" set limits on the protestors. Although the 
presence of tens of thousands of demonstrators on the streets made the 
situation volatile, to appeal for dialogue was to accept for the short-term a 
self-limiting role for the crowd and to renounce any seizure of the state.' A 
classic justification by one CM leader, Jens Reich, is cited by Maier (169): 'We 
never wanted power. It would have conflicted with our commitment to 
legality.' 'Self-limitation' was the order of the day. When delegations from 
major workplaces approached CM leaders to propose strike action in support 
of democratic demands the response was negative. When demonstrators 
sought to occupy SED and Stasi buildings, CM groups organized to prevent 
entry. When popular pressure brought down the Wall, many CM leaders were 
shocked. One 'suggested that what remained of the Wall should "exist a bit 
longer"' (Maier 199), while another even considered appealing for its 
reconstruction. 
Nor was the 'collapse' as straightforward as is often imagined. When Maier 
proclaims that (120) '[p]ower passed to the streets' he is voicing a common 
misconception. In fact, neither regime nor state simply 'collapsed'. It is 
certainly true - and was glorious to witness - that the supposedly omniscient 
Stasi was unable to contain mass emigration or protest. However, all the key 
institutions of power remained intact, even if some heads rolled. Some 
sections of the nomenclatura, led by Hans Modrow, quickly came to realize 
that transformation was unstoppable, but saw that if reforms were made and 
the CM were courted revolution might be restricted to the 'passive' kind, with 
limited popular protest and only minimal changing of the old guard.10 Under 
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 The fear of radicalization of protest was not restricted to the East 
German ruling class. Helmut Kohl assured SED leader Krenz that in this 
respect, if no other, they were shoulder to shoulder (cf. Dale 108). 
Modrow the SED set about wooing CM leaders, offering them a morsel of 
'responsibility' in return for their complicity in dampening protest. The olive 
branch was accepted. Accordingly, when popular mobilization built towards 
its zenith - not, as usually assumed in October, but in December and January 
- CM leaders entered a 'crisis-management' alliance with the regime, at first 
around a 'Round Table', and subsequently in government. 
Maier describes the round tables as the institutional expression of 'self-
limitation'; they aimed to realize 'an armistice between protesters and state', 
and served as 'a surrogate for the constituent assembl[y] that the transition 
process never convoked' (184). However, this ghostly surrogate was practically 
powerless. Moreover, it lacked legitimacy, so failed even to conclude the 
'armistice'. Rather, it came to be seen as symbolizing the CM's complicity with 
the SED, and thereby exacerbated the gap between the CM and the bulk of 
the protest movement. The demands of the latter now became directed more 
and more towards the corruption and greed of the nomenclatura, the 
shameless persistence of the Stasi, and the demand for German unification. 
The growing force and militancy of this movement, combined with continued 
emigration, underwrote what Maier describes as (255) 'the sudden erosion of 
credibility for the East German government in mid-January'. 
This was the second highpoint of the revolution: protestors were emboldened 
by success; they now raised demands which directly challenged the rule and 
institutions of the SED and even the existence of the state itself. It is also the 
point at which the sympathy of liberals tends to expire - as exemplified by 
Maier's depiction of angry protestors storming a Stasi headquarters (164) as 
'ugly and on a rampage'. 
How, though, should the split in the movement be assessed? Maier (374) 
refers to 'the divergence of two streams of protest: the one emanating from 
dissident groups and the church-oriented; the other based on the ... working 
class, fed up with urban overcrowding and material and ecological privation.' 
As we have seen, the former tended to prioritize 'dialogue' while the latter 
relied exclusively on public protest. Regarding goals, the latter generally 
supported German unification. But, as Offe argues (16), the nationalism 
displayed was hardly that of an 'emotionalized Volk', but was essentially 
'instrumental' in nature, aimed at eliciting economic support from the FRG. It 
was the combination of seeing the quality of life in West Germany and hearing 
revelations of the extent of economic crisis and ruling class hypocrisy and 
corruption that 'produced a feeling, especially amongst older workers, that for 
years they had been betrayed of the fruits of their labour.' (Hoffman and Rink 
120).11 
For such groups, Maier suggests (118) 'absorption in West Germany was 
precisely the guarantee of liberty and welfare they craved.' West Germany 
seemed to offer a definite, gilt-edged promise of civil liberties, democracy, and 
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 Evidently, motives for demanding unification were strongly linked to 
perceptions of exploitation, thus refuting Kopstein's suggestion that the 
(192) 'revolutions of autumn 1989 ... were largely political actions of 
dissatisfied consumers, not, as Marxian social theory would have us expect, 
of dissatisfied producers.' 
a decent living standard. The CM, by contrast, offered little. Its leaders 
refused even to consider the possibility of taking power, seemed to consider 
austerity to be a virtue, were ambiguous in their attitude to the Wall, and 
even entered into alliance with the SED - just as revelations of the latter's 
mismanagement and corruption were being greeted by resounding popular 
anger and a growing clamour for an emphatic break with the ruling class - 
party, state and all. This was the basis of the movement for unification. It was 
certainly nationalistic, but that should not imply that the divergence was 
between nationalism and internationalism. Rather, it expressed a choice of 
nationalisms. Some prominent currents of the CM defended the existence of 
the GDR and identified with it as the valid nation; an identification that, in 
turn, spurred the growing diversion of mass support from CM to the FRG. 
The split in the movement was also reflected culturally. In one of the most 
vivid sections of his book, Maier reflects upon the linguistic aspect of the 
divergence. Despite a preoccupation with 'communication' between 'state and 
society', CM intellectuals often spoke the same language as state 
spokespeople. An abstruse and systems-theoretical jargon was, on the one 
hand, (134) 'invoked both by the regime and by the intellectuals who would 
transform it. On the other hand, a rhetoric of primeval popular assembly - the 
language of "antistructure," of shoulder-to-shoulder community - arose 
anonymously from the crowd. This second language was the more potent; like 
Joshua's trumpets it brought down the Wall.'12 
Why was the CM like this? Why did its rhetoric converge with that of the 
regime and diverge with that of the crowds on the streets? Offe offers a 
perceptive insight here, suggesting that the CM's predecessors, the opposition 
groups of the 1980s, had effectively been (141) 'sealed off from the rest of 
society'. In this context, they had developed in a 'new social movement' 
direction, which rendered them (21) 'unable, with their issues and strategies, 
to gain support or sympathy from within the industrial working class'. Offe's 
case here is strong. If little else, the SED had mastered the techniques of the 
management of dissidence. Oppositionists had been fairly successfully 
quarantined within the walls of the church, with extra-church activity heavily 
repressed. The church acted as a container, in both senses of the word - 
functioning as a host to dissidence but also as a severe steward of its 
boundaries. Both church officials and undercover Stasi agents acted to 
theologize and individualize dissent, and to smother political activity, ensuring 
that if organized opposition could arise at all it was heavily skewed towards 
pious moderation. 
The outbreak of revolution revealed that the organized opposition had 
internalized the limits of the status quo more deeply than most of the popular 
movement. Their disorientation in the face of rapid political change, their 
readiness to engage in 'dialogue' with a despised regime, their defence of a 
state that had clearly lost all popular support, and their astonishment that 
'apathetic' workers would rise up en masse, were all products of an 
internalization of those narrow limits to action and thought which had 
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 'But' he adds 'it would have been too much to expect that it might 
become a durable hegemonic discourse.' 
sedimented into tablets of stone over the long years in which gradualist 
pragmatism had seemed the only viable strategy for social change. It is a 
poignant irony that the former oppositionists, despite years of courageous 
defiance in the face of repression, ultimately placed greater trust in the SED 
than did the bulk of the protest movement. 
 
Where now for Germany and the Left? 
 
With the dust of battle now cleared, how have the revolutions of 1989 altered 
prospects for democracy, for the Left, for Germany? For Offe, 1989 
represented the closing down of alternatives. With the end of the Cold War 
prospects for the Left are worse than ever (190). His book reads as a 
phlegmatic affirmation of the inevitability of actually existing capitalism 
which, in its liberal form at least, has the virtue of embodying a civilized mode 
of social regulation based upon constitutionalism and the rule of law. 
Maier's case is crisper. Whereas Offe bases his fatalism on a diagnosis of 
communism that emphasizes its opposition to capitalism, Maier insists (329) 
'that it advances our understanding to compare the problems of late 
communism with the contemporaneous difficulties faced by the advanced 
capitalist countries.' From this viewpoint, the breakdown of communism 
represents not the closing of historical alternatives but a salutary reminder of 
the sorts of contradictions that also confront otherwise more successful 
regions. 1989 did not simply represent the triumph of democracy but closed a 
decade which had seen an immense upwards transfer of wealth, a saturnalia 
of inequality and exploitation which (201) 'might yet prove as corrosive to 
democracy as the fall of communism was beneficial.' His concluding chapter, 
'Anschluss and Melancholy', ends with a cautionary juxtaposition (329): 'The 
harsh pressures of relative backwardness brought down the Soviet system in 
the 1980s and helped to liquidate the East German state that incorporated 
Russia's claim to have shared post-1945 leadership with the West. The 
pressures encroaching on the capitalist world from the 1970s to the 1990s led 
to the end of full employment, ... increasing inequality, and increasing 
dissension over economic integration. Thus the unease that East Germans 
brought to united Germany came to be increasingly matched by the malaise 
emerging in the wider society.'13 
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 If Maier's concluding chapter ends with a warning of malaise and 
portending crisis, his epilogue - which centres on the avant-garde artist 
Christo's wrapping of the Reichstag - is bizarrely upbeat. Wrapping the 
German parliament in Berlin, he reckons, has (332) 'liberated the building's 
parliamentary potential from the incubus of earlier failures of 
representative government. Unveiled, it might be born anew.' The born again 
building - released from its 'heavy legacy' of associations with Nazism - 
symbolically seals Germany's transition from a tortuous Sonderweg to liberal 
normality. As if that is not achievement enough, 'the wrapped Reichstag 
suggested' to Maier 'that these diverse Germans could be friendly as well as 
challenging.' Quite apart from the condescension of this statement, and 
leaving aside what 'normality' means for refugees or for the future victims 
of German participation in NATO offensives, it is striking that an author 
with such insight into the severity of Germany's current social 
contradictions can come up with sanguine speculation that bears as scant 
relation to German reality as the 'Diana effect' did to Britain. 
For this reviewer, Maier's comparison of crises East and West is a welcome 
antidote to the familiar 'End of History' refrain. Since 1989 Western Europe, 
especially Germany, has witnessed a marked increase in instability and social 
polarization. One product of this was an electoral 'pink tide' which culminated 
in the best general election result ever achieved by parties of the German Left. 
In this light, Offe's despondent predictions of disaster for the Left seem not 
merely false but quaint. With the connections between revolution in the East 
and turbulence in the West in mind, one might reread 1989 as a source of 
inspiration and invaluable insights into the algebra of revolution. Although 
the movement in East Germany was fairly successfully contained within 
bourgeois limits by established and reformist political forces - from Modrow to 
Kohl to the CM - it nevertheless furnished a glimpse of the potential that 
arises when established order breaks down in the face of collective protest. 
Despite the deadweight of the decades in which open resistance had been 
unthinkable, within a few weeks all was transformed. Breaking the power of 
the security forces opened up manifold possibilities for meaningful 
intervention 'from below'. In the face of one of the most extensive security 
apparati in the world, demonstrations were organized, democratic space 
forced open, and Honecker's regime overthrown. These things were done with 
growing wit and panache, displayed on countless placards, and in countless 
confrontations with advocates of 'law and order'. Aims and strategies were 
proposed, developed, defended and rejected; organizations were initiated, 
built, or abandoned; all during a four month-long conflagration of popular 
democratic debate and initiative. In short, ordinary East Germans seized the 
political agenda, and even shook the international sphere - forcing rapid 
unification and knocking any remaining diplomatic cards out of Gorbachev's 
hands. 
In the process, and particularly during the radicalization in December and 
January, a glimpse was given of the potential displayed by movements in 
revolutionary crises to radicalize, accelerate, and change direction, and to 
reveal in the process hitherto unsuspected collective capacities. Amongst the 
many outcomes of 1989, then, we may include not only the achievement of 
democratic rights, and the liberating blow to Stalinism, but also the timely 
reminder that social change does not just proceed gradually, but also through 
revolutions, those switching points when collective organization and political 
consciousness may come to the fore as key determinants of the course of 
history.                                                        [FINAL DRAFT] 
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